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Abstract
We consider strategic voting with incomplete information and partially common val-
ues in sequential committees. A proposal is considered against the status quo in one
committee, and only upon its approval advances for consideration in a second committee.
Committee members (i) are privately and imperfectly informed about an unobservable
state of nature which is relevant to their payoffs, and (ii) have a publicly observable bias
with which they evaluate information. We show that the tally of votes in the originating
committee can aggregate and transmit relevant information for members of the second
committee in equilibrium, provide conditions for the composition and size of commit-
tees under which this occurs, and characterize all three classes of voting equilibria with
relevant informative voting.
JEL classification numbers: D72, D78, C72
Key words: strategic voting, committees, information aggregation, sequential voting,
bicameral legislatures.
Strategic Voting in Sequential Committees∗
Matias Iaryczower†
1 Introduction
Voting of bills in bicameral legislatures has a sequential structure: a bill is originated in
one chamber, and passes to the other chamber for consideration only after having been
voted by a (possibly qualified) majority of representatives on the floor. This sequential
arrangement of committees is in no way unique to bicameral legislatures. Still in the
legislative arena, bills are typically considered by the floor of legislative bodies only
after being approved by a majority of votes in the relevant standing committee. And in
universities, faculty appointments typically require the approval of an “administrative”
committee following the approval of a committee composed of faculty members of the
relevant department.
A stylized fact common to all these examples is the outcome of the vote in the first
committee can influence the outcome of the vote in the second committee beyond the
binary decision of whether to approve or reject the alternative in the first committee:
the larger the tally of votes in favor of the proposal in the initiating committee, the
highest its success rate in the receiving committee.1 In this paper, we propose a simple
explanation for this stylized fact. If committee members have private information about
the relative value of the alternatives under consideration, voting outcomes can aggregate
and transmit relevant information to members of the receiving committee. What is less
straightforward is whether members of the originating committee will have incentives
to vote informatively in equilibrium, and if so under what conditions. Which compo-
sitions and sizes of committees facilitate or hinder the transmission and aggregation of
information in this environment?
∗I am thankful to to Juliana Bambaci, Randy Calvert, Federico Echenique, Navin Kartik, Santiago
Oliveros, and participants at the MPSA annual conference for comments to earlier versions of this paper.
All errors remain my own.
†Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California
91125, USA, email: miaryc@hss.caltech.edu
1As Oleszek (2004) notes regarding committees in the U.S. House of Representatives, “Bills voted out
of committee unanimously stand a good chance on the floor. A sharply divided committee vote presages
an equally sharp dispute on the floor (pg. 102)”
To assess these questions, we develop a simple model of strategic voting with incom-
plete information and partially common values in sequential committees. The model
builds on the seminal contributions of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), and Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1997, 1998). As usual in the literature, committee members are pri-
vately and imperfectly informed about an unobservable state of nature which is relevant to
their payoffs. Here, however, voting does not occur in single-committee systems. Instead,
a proposal can prevail only by defeating the status quo by (possibly qualified) majority
voting first in one and, provided it is successful there, then in a second committee (whose
members, we assume, can observe the vote outcome in the initiating committee).
What does and what does not change vis-a-vis the standard single-committee setting?
Note first that the strategic problem of members of the receiving committee is essentially
the same as that of members of a single committee: in deciding their vote, individuals of
the receiving committee care only about the event in which they are pivotal, and they
are pivotal in the traditional sense of being the decisive vote in a divided committee
(the standard-pivotal motive). The possibility of observing the outcome of the vote in
the originating committee, however, introduces two main differences in the incentives of
members of both committees. First, members of the receiving committee can condition
their behavior on the realization of votes in the originating committee. When some
members of the originating committee vote informatively, the tally of the votes in favor
of the alternative becomes an informative public signal for members of the receiving
committee, allowing different voting strategies to be equilibria in the second committee
for different voting outcomes in the first committee. Second, as opposed to members of
the receiving committee, members of the originating committee can influence the outcome
both in the traditional sense of killing or passing the proposal in their committee, and
by influencing the beliefs of members of the receiving committee regarding the relative
value of the two alternatives (what we call the signal-pivotal voting motive).
We show that there are two classes of voting equilibria in which the tally of votes
in favor of the proposal in the originating committee transmits relevant information to
members of the receiving committee. In the first class, the receiving committee uncon-
ditionally (independently of the private information of its members) kills the proposal
following sufficiently low vote tallies in the originating committee, and unconditionally
approves the proposal otherwise. In equilibria of this class, informative voting occurs
only in the originating committee; the second committee acts only to raise the hurdle
that the alternative has to surpass in the first committee to defeat the status quo in
equilibrium. As a result, the strategic problem of members of the originating committee
in equilibria of this class resembles that of members of a single committee: their vote
decision is guided by the standard-pivotal voting motive, as amended by the endogenous
majority rule implied by the equilibrium behavior of members of the receiving committee.
We call equilibria of class endogenous majority rule (EMR) voting equilibria.
The second class encompasses voting equilibria in which not only members of the orig-
inating committee vote informatively, but so do - following some realizations of the vote in
the originating committee - members of the receiving committee. In particular, we show
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that in any equilibrium of this class there is a responsive set of initiating-committee vot-
ing outcomes in which the probability of the proposal being accepted increases (strictly)
with the tally of votes in favor of the proposal in the originating committee. This occurs
either because the number of individuals voting informatively in the receiving committee
increases with higher tallies as a result of individuals switching from voting against the
proposal unconditionally to voting informatively, or because the number of informative
votes decreases with higher tallies as a result of individuals switching from voting in-
formatively to voting for the proposal unconditionally, or both. As a result, in voting
equilibria with relevant two-sided informative voting, the voting behavior of members of
the originating committee is guided by a signal-pivotal motive.
Voting equilibria with transmission of information between committees have to be
of one of the classes above. But under what conditions, if any, do EMR and two-sided
informative voting equilibria exist? What in particular are the implications for the size
and composition of committees? We address these questions in a setting that allows
for open conflicts of interests between committee members: individuals are biased for or
against the status quo, and this bias is public information. The distinction boils down
to a different threshold with which individuals of different types evaluate information:
conservatives - those biased for the status quo - require overwhelming evidence in favor of
the proposal to prefer it over the status quo, and similarly liberals require overwhelming
evidence against the proposal to favor the status quo.2 To make this distinction mean-
ingful, we assume that an individual’s own private information can never overturn the
preference between alternatives implied by the bias.
In this setting, we establish existence of EMR and two-sided informative voting equi-
libria for plausible conditions on the size and composition of committees. We show that a
key determinant for existence of equilibria of these classes is the “partisan” (ideological)
composition of the receiving committee, and specifically whether conservatives can or can
not block the passage of the proposal in the receiving committee. When they can, there
is always an EMR voting equilibrium with k conservatives in the originating committee
voting informatively as long as the total number of conservatives in the originating com-
mittee is sufficiently large. When instead liberals are a winning coalition in the receiving
committee, an equilibrium of this class can only exist if liberals are a winning coalition in
both committees. Moreover, when this exists, the number of informative votes is bounded
above by the majority premium of liberals in the originating committee.
Endogenous Majority Rule voting equilibria have attractive properties - they are ex-
tremely simple and also robust to sequential voting within each committee - but they
are also inefficient, as no information from members of the receiving committee is incor-
porated in the collective decision. Third, then, we show that under some conditions the
relevant majority can do better than in the most informative EMR voting equilibrium
by simply delegating all relevant decision making to the receiving committee. For sim-
ple majority rule, in particular, the condition boils down to a comparison between the
2This is essentially without loss of generality, as we can capture the common interest case allowing
for one type only.
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majority premium of liberals in each committee when liberals are a winning coalition
in the receiving committee, but between the majority premium of conservatives in the
receiving committee and the total number of conservatives in the originating committee
when instead conservatives are a blocking coalition in the receiving committee.
Finally, we address existence of voting equilibria with two-sided relevant informative
voting. We show that for an equilibrium of this class to exist it is sufficient that con-
servatives form a blocking coalition in the receiving committee and that the number of
conservatives in the originating committee is sufficiently large. We also show, however,
that there can exist a voting equilibrium with relevant two sided informative voting in
which each of a small number of conservatives in the originating committee votes infor-
matively. Moreover, this strategy profile remains an equilibrium when voting within each
committee is allowed to be sequential as well. Finally, we show that when liberals are
a winning coalition in the receiving committee it is both necessary and sufficient that
liberals also control the originating committee for a voting equilibrium with relevant two
sided informative voting that is robust to sequential voting within each committee to
exist. Thus also in this class it is key whether conservatives can or cannot block the
passage of the proposal in the receiving committee.
2 Relation with the Literature
This paper builds on the pioneering contributions of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997, 1998), and connects at least three strands of related
research.
First, Piketty (2000) and Razin (2003) also build around the idea of voting as commu-
nicating, where voters have some type of signal-pivotal voting motive. In Piketty (2000),
however, there are two outcomes corresponding to two stages of choices (an electorate
chooses by plurality rule between two alternatives, the winner is implemented for one
period, and then competes against a third alternative to be implemented in a second pe-
riod), and the focus is on the inefficiency caused on the intermediate choice by the desire
of voters to communicate information relevant to the second choice. In our sequential
committees, this intermediate stage of payoffs simply does not exist, as the alternative
approved by the first committee does not become an outcome - and hence does not in-
fluence payoffs - until also approved by the second committee. In Razin (2003), on the
other hand, there is only one stage of voting, but the elected candidate uses the outcome
of the vote to select the policy she will implement, in a single dimensional policy space.
This richer space allows the outcome to be strictly responsive to the tally of votes for
the winner in the election. In our setting, instead, this responsiveness comes with the
probability of the proposal being passed in the receiving committee being increasing in
the tally in the first committee.3
3In both of these papers, a first stage of voting communicates information for a second stage relevant
to the determination of policy. A similar phenomenon arises in this regard when players can explicitly
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Our paper also relates to several papers exploring an alternative kind of sequentiality
in voting in committees. In Dekel and Piccione (2000), as in Fey (1998), Wit (1997),
Battaglini (2005), Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2007), Callender (2007), and Ali and
Kartik (2006), the focus is on sequential voting among members of a single committee:
individuals can vote after observing prior votes by other voters in the population, but
all votes are then aggregated in the same tally and the collective choice is determined
by majority rule. None of these papers, however, considers sequential voting between
committees. The two approaches provide complementary lessons for the study of hybrid
systems lying in between these models, as that employed in the US presidential primaries.
Third is the also very closely related paper by Maug and Yilmaz (2002), which studies
simultaneous voting in two committees in a setting similar to the one considered here
(committees, however, are internally homogeneous, divided by type of voter). While the
two papers are clearly complementary, simultaneous voting among committees leads to
very different voting incentives to those faced by individuals in our setting, as there is
no role for signaling to members of the receiving committee, and no way to condition
behavior on history of play.4
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on transmission of information from
(standing) committees to the whole assembly pioneered by Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987).
Gilligan and Krehbiel build - as do to our knowledge all subsequent contributions in the
literature - on the seminal contribution of Crawford and Sobel (1982), and as a result treat
both the committee and the floor (our originating and receiving committees) as unitary
actors with the preferences of the respective median voters. Our analysis suggests that
this assumption can be quite problematic. We do not handle here however information
acquisition. This is a natural (and interesting) extension of the model that we leave for
future research.
3 The Model
A group of individuals arranged in two committees, C0 and C1, choose between a proposal
A and a status quo Q, both lying in an arbitrary policy space X. Committee j is
populated by an odd number nj of individuals, and the collective choice of each committee
j is determined by voting under a Rj-majority rule without abstention. Formally, letting
vi ∈ {−1, 1} denote i’s vote against (−1) or in favor (1) of the proposal, tj(vj) ≡
∑
i∈Cj vi
the net tally of votes in favor of the proposal in Cj, and zj ∈ {Q,A} the policy choice
deliberate prior to a voting stage. For models of voting with deliberation, see Coughlan (2000), Austen-
Smith and Feddersen (2005), Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006), and Gerardi and Yariv (2007). We
return to the possibility of deliberation in the discussion.
4The emphasis in Maug and Yilmaz (2002) is on the efficiency comparison of unicameral and (si-
multaneous) bicameral systems, and not on the positive or behavioral properties. We address this in
Iaryczower (2007).The comparison of unicameralism and bicameralism calls a much broader literature
to the one we can review here (but see Tsebelis and Money (1997), Cutrone and McCarty (2005), and
references within).
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in Cj, zj = A if and only if tj(vj) ≥ rj, for an odd integer rj such that 1 ≤ rj ≤ nj
(thus Rj =
nj+rj
2
). Voting is simultaneous in each committee, but sequential between
committees. In particular, we assume the following simple institutional environment: the
alternatives are first voted on in the originating committee C0. If the proposal defeats
the status quo in the originating committee (t0(v0) ≥ r0), the alternatives are then voted
on in the receiving committee C1, where z1 = A if and only if t1(v1) ≥ r1. If tj(vj) < rj
in any chamber j, the status quo remains (z = Q).
There are two equally likely realizations of an unobservable state of the world, ω ∈
{ωQ, ωA}, and each individual i ∈ Cj receives a private, imperfectly informative signal
si ∈ {−1, 1}, distributed independently conditional on the state, such that Pr(si = 1|ω =
ωA) = Pr(si = −1|ω = ωQ) = q > 1/2 (the restriction to uninformative priors is without
loss of generality). Individuals’ preferences have an ideological and a common value
component. Each individual i ∈ Cj has a publicly known ideology bias bi either for or
against the proposal, and we say that i is either a liberal or a conservative, respectively.
Liberals and conservatives differ in their ranking of alternatives conditional on observing
the same information. In particular, (moderate) liberals prefer the proposal to the status
quo whenever Pr(ω = A|I) > piA for some piA < 1/2, while (moderate) conservatives
prefer the proposal to the status quo whenever Pr(ω = A|I) > piQ for some piQ >
1/2.5 We will assume throughout, moreover, that biases are sufficiently strong relative
to the precision of the private information so that for any individual i, knowledge of the
realization of her own signal si would not be enough to revert her desired policy outcome;
i.e., we will assume that piQ > q and piA < 1− q.
A b-biased individual can be one of two possible types. With probability 1−α, i is a
moderate, and has the preferences described above. With probability α > 0, individual
i is a partisan and always votes her bias. We will focus on equilibria of the game as
α → 0, and restrict attention to pure (symmetric or asymmetric) anonymous strategy
profiles.6 A pure strategy for a (moderate) individual i ∈ Cj is a mapping σi from the
set of signals {−1, 1} and feasible histories Hj to a vote vi ∈ {−1, 1}.7 Since h0 = ∅, we
5To be more precise, we assume that for a given λi ∈ (0, 1/2), i ∈ Cj obtains payoff λi if the policy
outcome matches his or her bias (if z = bi), and payoff (1− λi) if the policy outcome matches the state
(if z = ω). Letting f(z|ω) = 1 if z = ω, 0 otherwise, and W (z; bi) = 1 if z = bi, 0 otherwise, we write
the payoff of individual i with bias b given policy outcome z as: U(z; b) = λiW (z; b) + (1 − λi)f(z|ω).
Thus, given information I, i has induced preferences E[U(z; b)|I] = λiW (z; b) + (1 − λi) Pr(ω = z|I),
and E[U(A; b)|I] > E[U(Q; b)|I] whenever Pr(ω = A|I) > p˜ib(λi):
p˜iA(λi) =
1− 2λi
2(1− λi) <
1
2
and p˜iQ(λi) =
1
2(1− λi) >
1
2
6While some papers in the literature take this approach, by far the most prevalent is to restrict the
analysis to symmetric mixed strategies. To the best of our knowledge, however, there seems to be no
clear ranking between these alternative approaches. As it will become clear later, moreover, it is not
difficult to see that most (and possibly all) of our results would also continue to hold for symmetric
mixed strategy profiles.
7Let hj be the history prior to the vote in committee j. Since C0 is the first to vote, h0 = ∅. Since
C1 only votes if A defeats Q in the lower committee, feasible histories for individuals in C1, h1, are
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will sometimes simply write σi(si, ∅) for i ∈ C0 as σi(si). Let σj(sj, hj) ≡ {σi(si, hj)}i∈Cj ,
and σ ≡ (σ0(s0), σ1(s1, h1)). We say that a strategy profile σ(·) is a voting equilibrium
if there exists an α > 0 such that for all α < α there exist beliefs {µαi (s−i|si, hj)} such
that (σ, µα) are a PBE of the game Γα in pure anonymous strategies.
4 Strategic Voting in Sequential Committees
We start by formalizing the notions of standard-pivotal and signal-pivotal voting moti-
vations. Consider first a committee C which after history h has the sole authority over
whether to approve or reject the proposal (this might be a single committee, in which case
h = ∅, or the receiving committee in a pair of committees moving sequentially, in which
case h = v0). The vote of any member i ∈ C influences the outcome if and only if i is
standard-pivotal in C after h; i.e., if and only if vh−i ∈ Pi(C, r) ≡ {v−i : t−i(v−i) = r− 1}.
As a result, i’s voting decision is determined by her preference among alternatives as
evaluated at the event Pi(C, r) in equilibrium. Then letting
λ
Pi(C,r)
i (si, h) ≡ lim
α→0
Pr(σ|h,α)(ωA|si,Pi(Cj, rj), h), (1)
we say that a strategy profile σ|h is a voting equilibrium in C if and only if σi(si) = 1⇔
λ
Pi(C,r)
i (si, h) ≥ pii whenever Pi(C, r) has positive probability under σ|h.
The fundamental difference with respect to voting in a single committee is entirely
in the incentives of members of the originating committee, whose vote is guided by a
signal-pivotal motivation. For any vote outcome of members of C0 other than i, v0−i, let
v−0−i ≡ (v0−i, vi = −1) and v+0−i ≡ (v0−i, vi = +1). We say that an individual i ∈ C0 is
signal-pivotal at k if (i) the tally of votes of members of C0 other than i equals k, and
(ii) the proposal loses in the receiving committee if also i votes against the proposal in
C0, but wins in the receiving committee if i votes in favor of the proposal in C0; i.e., if
(v0−i, v
v−0−i
1 , v
v+0−i
1 ) ∈ SP i(r1, k), where
SP i(r1, k) ≡ {(v0−i, vv
−
0−i
1 , v
v+0−i
1 ) : t0−i(v0−i) = k, t1(v
v−0−i
1 ) ≤ r1 − 2, t1(v
v+0−i
1 ) ≥ r1}
We say that an individual i ∈ C0 is signal-pivotal if SP i(r1, k) 6= ∅ for some k. Letting
K(σ) ≡ {k : SP i(r1, k) 6= ∅}, SP i(r1) ≡ ∪k∈K(σ)SP i(r1, k), we then define:
λSPi (si; r1) ≡
∑
k∈K(σ)
lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, k))f(si, k), (2)
where f(si, k) ≡ lim
α→0
Pr(σ0−i,α)(si,SP i(r1, k))|si,SP i(r1)). Then if σ is a voting equilib-
rium, it must be that for all i ∈ C0, σi(si) = 1⇔ λSPi (si; r1) ≥ pii whenever SP i(r1) has
positive probability under σ.
elements of H1 = {v0 : t0(v0) ≥ r0}. By anonymous we mean that σi(si, h10) = σi(si, h11) whenever h11
can be obtained from h10 by only switching elements among lower committee members that play the
same strategy.
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We start our analysis in the next section by briefly establishing the key properties of
voting equilibria in single committees. For this and throughout the paper it will be useful
to express, when possible, posterior probabilities and preferences in terms of a relevant
number of positive and negative signals. To this end, we adopt the following conventions
throughout the paper. Let J ⊂ C be an arbitrary subset of members of a committee C.
For a given profile of signals sJ ≡ {si}i∈J , we write β(tJ (sJ )) ≡ Pr(ω = ωA|sJ ),8 and
let ρA and ρQ be the (unique) integers such that β(ρb − 1) ≤ pib ≤ β(ρb) for b = A,Q.
The numbers ρQ and (1− ρA) measure the intensity of the bias of conservative (liberal)
committee members in terms of the least number of positive (negative) signals that would
reverse their policy preference (from our earlier assumption, ρQ ≥ 2 and 1 − ρA ≥ 2).
We let SJ (t;σJ ) ≡ {sJ : tJ (σJ (sJ )) = t}, and assuming then that SJ (t;σJ ) 6= ∅, define
τsJ (t, σJ , hJ ) as the sum of the signals of individuals voting informatively in J that is
consistent with a vote tally t following history hJ and given strategy profile σJ if all
members of J are moderates:
τsJ (t, σJ , hJ ) ≡ t− |{i ∈ J : σi(si, hJ ) = 1}|+ |{i ∈ J : σi(si, hJ ) = −1}| (3)
Then letting for any event E, L(E) ≡ lim
α→0
Prσ,α(E|ωQ)
Prσ,α(E|ωA) , it follows that
9
λ
Pi(C,r)
i (si, h) =
1
1 + L(si)L(Pi(C, r))L(h) = β(si + τs−i(r − 1;σ−i) + τ0(h))
, where τ0(h) = 0 for single committees (h = 0) and τ0(h) = τs0(t0(v0), σ0) for the case of
sequential committees (h = v0). Therefore, a conservative member of C has an incentive
to vote in favor of the proposal if and only if β(si + τs−i(r − 1;σ−i) + τ0(h)) ≥ piQ, or
equivalently τs−i(r − 1;σ−i + τ0(h) + si ≥ ρQ (similarly for a liberal member, substitute
ρA).
4.1 Basic Results for Single (and Receiving) Committees
We begin with the simplest case of a committee with common interests; i.e., pii = pi
∀i ∈ C. Here, and in the remainder of the paper, we will follow convention by saying
that i ∈ C` votes informatively if vi(s, ∅) = s ∀s, and that she votes her bias if vi(s, ∅) = bi
∀s. We start by pointing out a well known result due to Austen-Smith and Banks (1996)
Proposition 1 Consider a committee composed of n members such that pii = pi ∀i =
1, . . . , n, operating under a r+n
2
majority rule (z = A if and only if t(v) ≥ r). Then
informative voting for all i is a voting equilibrium iff r = ρ.10
8The definition of tJ (sJ ) follows the same convention as with votes; i.e., tJ (sJ ) ≡
∑
i∈J si. Note
that Pr(ω = ωA|sJ ) = Pr(ω = ωA|s′J ) whenever tJ (sJ ) = tJ (s′J ).
9Note that if E1 and E2 are independent, then Pr(ωA|E1, E2) = [1 + L(E1)L(E2)]−1, and that for
any J ⊆ C, L(sJ :
∑
i∈J si = t) =
(
1−q
q
)t
.
10The result is stated for ρ is odd. If ρ is even the condition is r = ρ+ 1.
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The logic behind this result is straightforward. Since all committee members vote
informatively, the net number of signals implied by standard pivotality is τs−i(r−1, σ−i) =
r − 1 and therefore λPi(C,r)i (si) = β(r − 1 + si). Incentive compatibility of σ requires
λ
Pi(C,r)
i (−1) ≤ pi ≤ λPi(C,r)i (1), and hence β(r − 2) ≤ pi ≤ β(r). Then either r = ρ + 1
(if ρ is even) or r = ρ (if ρ is odd). On the other hand, suppose r ≥ ρ + 2. Then
λ
Pi(C,r)
i (−1) = β(r− 2) ≥ β(ρ), and hence i has incentive to deviate and vote in favor of
the proposal after a negative signal (a similar argument holds if r ≤ ρ− 1).
More generally, in the case of a single committee with common interests, equilibria
must fall in one of two outcome-relevant classes. First, there exists a class of non-
informative equilibria in which the policy outcome is equal to the committee members’
bias independently of the private information held by members of the committee. In
these equilibria σi(si) = bi ∀si for some decisive majority in C (for all i in some set
J ⊆ C such that |J | ≥ r+n
2
). That this is in fact an equilibrium follows immediately,
since in any such strategy profile no individual is ever pivotal, and therefore there are no
profitable deviations.11 We can typically also construct an asymmetric voting equilibrium
in which some committee members vote informatively. Intuitively, here the number of
informative votes k is chosen so that for any voting member, the information provided
by the equilibrium strategies conditional on him being pivotal exactly compensates the
imbalance between the effective rule and ρ.12
To see this, consider the following example. Suppose agents are unbaised, so that
pi = 1/2, and that n = 11 and r = 3 (the proposal wins if and only if it receives 7 out
of 11 votes). Then the strategy profile in which agents 1 to 9 vote informatively and the
remaining vote unconditionally in favor of the proposal is a voting equilibrium. Note that
according to σ∗, if i ≤ 9 is pivotal then t−i(σ−i(s−i)) = 2 +
∑j 6=i
j≤9 si = 2, and as a result
τ−i(2, σ−i) = 0; i.e., the signals of other players must cancel out. Incentive compatibility is
then satisfied since λ
Pi(C,r)
i (si = −1) = β(−1) = 1−q ≤ 1/2 ≤ q = β(1) = λPi(C,r)i (si = 1)
(incentive compatibility for i ≥ 10 follows from τ−i(2, σ−i) = 1). This example suggests
that different differences between r and ρ correspond to different bounds on the amount
of information that can be used in equilibrium. This is in fact generally the case, as
Proposition 2 shows:
Proposition 2 Consider a committee composed of n members i such that pii = pi ∀i,
ρ(pi) ≤ n, operating under a r+n
2
majority rule. Then (i) there exists a unique voting
equilibrium with relevant informative voting if and only if −(n − r) ≤ ρ ≤ R, and (ii)
the number of informative votes in this voting equilibrium is decreasing in the difference
|r − ρ|.
Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
11Equilibria in which σi(si) = −bi ∀si for all i in some decisive set J ⊆ C are ruled out due to the
existence of partisans.
12This is well known. See for example Dekel and Piccione (2000) or Persico (2004). The logic is
essentially the same as that in symmetric equilibria in mixed strategies which are often considered in
the literature (see for example Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997)).
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The previous results are essentially unchanged - for the relevant population - if, as it
is the case in our main model, we introduce two groups with different biases; i.e., there
are nQ members with bias pii = piQ > q and n− nQ members with bias pii = piA < 1− q.
First, it is immediate to verify that given that piQ > q > 1 − q > piA, (i) there is no
equilibrium in which both conservatives and liberals vote informatively, and that (ii) if
in a voting equilibrium i votes informatively and bi 6= bi′ , then i′ must vote her bias.
Note then that informative voting by liberals can only be outcome relevant if liberals
are a winning coalition in C. Similarly, informative voting by conservatives can only be
outcome relevant if conservatives are a blocking coalition in C (we say that individuals
in a a subset J of committee C constitute a winning coalition in C, and denote this by
J ∈ W (C), if |J | ≥ R. Alternatively, J ⊂ C is a blocking coalition in C, or J ∈ B(C),
if |J | ≥ n−R + 1).
Since in any equilibrium with relevant informative voting individuals voting informa-
tively must be conservatives when conservatives are a blocking coalition in C (liberals
when instead liberals are a winning coalition in C), then liberals (conservatives) vote
their bias in equilibrium and therefore just act so as to change the number of votes re-
quired to pass the proposal. What rests to be determined is then formally equivalent -
in the case of a single committee - to the analysis in Proposition 2 with majority rule
RD ≡ rD+nD2 and population nD, where rD = r − nA and nD = nQ when Q ∈ B(C)
and rD = r + nQ and nD = nA when A ∈ W (C). The same logic holds, moreover, if
the committee is the second of two committees moving sequentially, after we incorporate
the information contained in the tally in ex post biases ρ′Q(v0, σ0) ≡ ρQ − τs0(v0, σ0) and
ρ′A(t0(v0), σ0) ≡ ρA − τs0(t0(v0), σ0). We summarize the result in the next Proposition.
For this, and the remainder of the paper, it will be useful to introduce the following
definition.
Definition 1 We will say that the strategy profile of a set of individuals J ∈ Cj is k-
informative with liberal (conservative) bias if there exist a labeling of individuals in J
such that all i ∈ J I(k) ≡ {i ∈ J : i ≤ k} vote informatively and (ii) all i ∈ J N(k) ≡
{i ∈ J : i > k} vote in favor (against) the proposal.
Then we have shown that,13
Proposition 3 (i) Assume Q1 ∈ B(C1). Then there exists a unique voting equilibrium
with relevant informative voting in Γ(v0) if and only if −(RQ1 − rQ1 ) ≤ ρ′Q(v0, σ0) ≤ RQ1 .
In this equilibrium, liberals vote their bias and conservatives play a (i) a k˜0(t0(v0))-
informative strategy profile with conservative bias if rQ1 ≤ ρ′Q(v0, σ0) and (ii) a k˜1(t0(v0))-
informative strategy profile with liberal bias if rQ1 > ρ
′
Q(v0, σ0), where k˜
0(t0(v0)) ≡ nQ1 −
[ρ′Q(v0, σ0)− rQ1 ] and k˜1(t0(v0)) = nQ1 − [rQ1 − ρ′Q(v0, σ0)] + 1.
(ii) When instead A1 ∈ W (C1), there exists a unique voting equilibrium with relevant
informative voting in Γ(v0) if and only if −[(R1−1)−r1] ≤ 1−ρ′A(v0, σ0) ≤ [RA1 −(rA1 −1)].
13The result is stated for the second of two committees moving sequentially. For a single committee,
simply write ρ′D(v0, σ0) = ρD and ignore all references to the history.
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In this equilibrium, conservatives vote their bias and liberals play a (i) a k˜0(t0(v0))-
informative strategy profile with conservative bias if −[1 − ρ′A(v0, σ0)] ≥ rA1 and (ii) a
k˜1(t0(v0))-informative strategy profile with liberal bias if −[1 − ρ′A(v0, σ0)] < rA1 , where
k˜0(t0(v0)) ≡ nA1 − [(1−ρ′A(v0, σ0))− rA1 ], and k˜1(t0(v0)) = nA1 − [rA1 − (1−ρ′A(v0, σ0))] + 1.
Note, in particular, that the number of informative votes in the receiving committee
is decreasing in the difference between the effective hurdle r′D that individuals voting
informatively in the receiving committee must surpass, and their ex post bias ρ′D(v0, σ0)
after observing the public signal τs0(t0, σ0).
Proposition 3 completely characterizes informative strategic voting in a single com-
mittee. We turn next to the analysis of voting in sequential committees. Note that
as for single committees, here the uninformative strategy profile in which individuals
in each committee vote unconditionally for the alternative when liberals are a winning
coalition in their committee (Aj ∈ W (Cj)) and for the status quo when conservatives
are a blocking coalition in their committee (Qj ∈ B(Cj)) is a voting equilibrium. In this
voting equilibrium, however, there is no transmission of information (or even more, no
use of information of any sort). We focus from here on on voting equilibria in which the
equilibrium outcome is responsive to private information; i.e., given σ, there exist two
realizations of private signals s, s′ ∈ S such that z = A under s but z = Q under s′.
The equilibrium outcome can be responsive to private information in (broadly) three
different ways, and we categorize classes of equilibria accordingly. In a voting equilibrium
with relevant one sided informative voting, all informative voting occurs in one commit-
tee (either in the originating or the receiving committee). When this happens in the
receiving committee, members of the originating committee must (collectively) approve
the proposal unconditionally (as otherwise the proposal would never reach the receiving
committee). When instead informative voting occurs only in the originating committee,
members of the receiving committee can act conditional on the outcome of this vote, but
only bluntly, approving the proposal unconditionally for some outcomes and “killing” it
unconditionally for others. Finally, the equilibrium outcome can be responsive to private
information in both committees. Here not only does the second committee acts condi-
tional on the outcome of the vote in the originating committee, but more specifically the
number of individuals voting informatively will be a function of the voting outcome in
C0. We begin in the next section by tackling voting equilibria in which all informative
voting occurs in the originating committee.
4.2 An Endogenous Majority Rule
We consider here voting equilibria in which all informative voting occurs in the originating
committee, which for reasons that will be apparent shortly we label endogenous majority
rule (EMR) voting equilibria. In equilibria of this class, the second committee acts only
to modify the hurdle that the alternative has to surpass in the first committee to defeat
the status quo in equilibrium (from, say, a simple majority to a two thirds majority),
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in such a way as to induce informative voting by some of its members in equilibrium:
the endogenous threshold introduced by the receiving committee “replicates” the effect
of the optimal fixed rule in Austen-Smith and Banks (1996).14
The main idea is the following: Suppose that the receiving committee kills the pro-
posal - independently of the realization of private information - for all voting outcomes
in the lower committee v0 with tally t0(v0) below some critical number θ0, and uncon-
ditionally approves the proposal otherwise. For members of the initiating committee,
this situation is equivalent to a unicameral system with a modified majority rule θ0. In
particular, λSPi (si; r1) boils down to
λSPi (si; r1) = β(τs0−i(θ0, σ
∗
0−i) + si) (4)
It follows from this and the results in section 4.1 that if, given the information provided
by the outcome of the vote and the voting strategy profile in the originating committee,
we can induce members of the relevant decisive coalition in C1 to choose the cutoff θ0 in
such a way that the ensuing endogenous majority rule for individuals voting informatively
in the originating committee is equal to ρQ (if they are conservatives) or (1 − ρA) (for
liberals), then these individuals would have an incentive to vote informatively in the
first place. Theorem 1 shows that this can always be done when conservatives are a
blocking coalition in the receiving committee provided that the number of conservatives
and liberals in C0 is large enough. In contrast to this positive result, the second part of
Theorem 1 shows that this is not possible when liberals control the second committee.
Theorem 1 There does not exist an EMR voting equilibrium in which all liberals in
the originating committee vote informatively. There exists an EMR voting equilibrium
in which all conservatives in the originating committee vote informatively if and only if
Q1 ∈ B(C1) and the number of liberals and conservatives in the originating committee is
sufficiently large (i.e., if and only if nQ0 > ρQ and n
A
0 ≥ (r0 − 1)− ρQ)15
Proof of Theorem 1. Follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 in the appendix.
The intuition for this contrast is as follows. Suppose first that liberals control the
receiving committee, and assume that in equilibrium all liberals in C0 vote informatively.
14Lemma 3 in the appendix shows that all voting equilibria in which all informative voting occurs in
the originating committee must be EMR voting equilibria.
15To see the role of these conditions, note that when conservatives vote informatively and liberals
vote their bias in the originating committee, these are equivalent to requiring that there exist tallies
t0 ≥ r0 and t′0 ≤ n0 such that t0 = t0(σ0(s0)) and t′0 = t0(σ0(s′0)) for some s0 and s′0 and τs0(t0, σ0) <
ρQ < τs0(t
′
0, σ0). First, since only conservatives in the originating committee are voting informatively,
nQ0 > ρQ assures that the maximum informativeness of the aggregate public signal for individuals in the
receiving committee is larger than the bias of conservatives. Second, nA0 ≥ (r0−1)−ρQ assures that the
R0-majority rule is not excessively demanding relative to the size of liberals in the originating committee
so as to make any tally that passes this threshold an overwhelming positive signal for conservatives in
the receiving committee. Note in particular that this condition is never binding for simple majority rule,
in which case it is enough that nQ0 > ρQ.
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The relevant incentive compatibility constraint is that of liberals voting against their
bias for “low tallies” (i.e., for v0 : t0(v0) ≤ θ0 − 1). Since the inference of an individual
i in the originating committee cannot be too different than that of a member of the
receiving committee in equilibrium (see the proof for details), members of the originating
committee voting informatively must be liberals too. Now since in equilibrium conserva-
tives can’t vote against their bias, this means that they must be voting their bias. But
this is not possible either, for in this case every positive net tally would carry favorable
information for the proposal, and the liberal winning coalition (which is already biased
in favor of the proposal), would never have an incentive to vote against it.
It is now apparent why it is not a problem to construct a EMR voting equilibrium
when conservatives are a blocking coalition in the receiving committee. The same logic
suggests, moreover, that when liberals are a winning coalition in the receiving committee,
it might be possible to have an EMR voting equilibrium in which some liberals in the
originating committee vote informatively: the asymmetry in the strategy profile of liberals
in the originating committee solves the previous problem by making unnecessary that
conservatives in C0 vote against their bias in order for some positive tally to transmit
unfavorable information for the proposal. A generalized version of Theorem 1 shows that
under some conditions this is in fact possible. This requires, however, liberals to be a
winning coalition not only in the receiving but also in the originating committee as well.
Moreover, as Theorem 2 shows, the number of informative votes can never be larger
than the majority premium of liberals in C0. The theorem also shows that for an EMR
voting equilibrium where some conservatives vote informatively we need only assure that
conservatives are a blocking coalition in the receiving committee and that the number of
conservatives in C0 is larger than ρQ.
Theorem 2 (i) Assume Q1 ∈ B(C1) and let k > ρQ be given. If the number of con-
servatives in the originating committee is sufficiently large, there exists an EMR voting
equilibrium with k informative votes; (ii) if A1 ∈ W (C1) an EMR voting equilibrium
exists only if liberals are also a winning coalition in the originating committee, and the
number of informative votes in any EMR voting equilibrium is bounded above by the
majority premium of liberals in the originating committee.
Proof of Theorem 2. Follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 in the appendix.
It follows from Theorems 1 and 2 that there are significant behavioral differences in
EMR voting equilibria when liberals are or are not a winning coalition in the receiving
committee. But there is a also a difference in terms of efficiency of equilibria in the
two cases. While EMR voting equilibria are inherently inefficient - since no information
from members of the receiving committee influences the choice of policy - the most
informative EMR voting equilibria when conservatives are a blocking coalition in the
receiving committee selects the “right” alternative (for conservatives) almost surely as
the number of conservatives and liberals in the originating committee is sufficiently high
(“right” here means the alternative that conservatives would prefer if all the private
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information were made public). This is not the case, however, when liberals are a winning
coalition in the receiving committee, as the number of informative votes in the most
informative EMR voting equilibria is bounded above by the majority premium of liberals
in the originating committee (Proposition 4 in the appendix makes this point formally).
4.3 Delegation to the Receiving Committee
In EMR voting equilibria, the role of members of the receiving committee is limited to
modifying the effective majority rule faced by members of the initiating committee. The
receiving committee approves the proposal when the tally of votes in the originating com-
mittee carries sufficient favorable information for the proposal, and rejects it otherwise,
but does not use the private information of its members. While under some conditions
this will lead the relevant decisive majority to achieve payoffs close to the maximum pos-
sible attainable payoffs under perfect information, in other cases it will lead to mistakes
occurring with high probability. We show in this section that under some conditions the
relevant majority can do better than in the most informative EMR voting equilibrium
by simply delegating all relevant decision making to the receiving committee.
The main intuition is straightforward. Suppose for concreteness that both commit-
tees are entirely composed by liberals, and that the first committee is small in size (say it
has three members) and the second committee is large. Then a EMR voting equilibrium
wastes a large amount of information, and incurs in mistakes with very high probability.
All committee members would do better in this case if members of the first committee
delegated the decision to members of the second committee by voting uninformatively in
favor of the proposal. Facing an uninformative history, members of the receiving com-
mittee could play a strategy profile with relevant informative voting that allows much
more information to be of use (all but |(1− ρA)− r1| members could vote informatively).
In general, the ranking between equilibria with one-sided relevant informative voting will
depend on the composition of committees. For simplicity, we focus here on the case of
simple majority rule. We show that for simple majority rule, the relevant comparison is
between the majority premium of liberals in each committee when liberals are a winning
coalition in the receiving committee, but between the majority premium of conserva-
tives in the receiving committee and the total number of conservatives in the originating
committee otherwise.
Consider first the case in which liberals don’t have a majority in the receiving com-
mittee. Let σ0 be an uninformative strategy profile in the originating committee with
associated vote outcome v0 and tally t0(v0) ≥ 1. Then Proposition 3 implies that if (and
only if) the bias of conservatives ρQ is lower than the effective majority rule for conserva-
tives when liberals vote in favor of the proposal (RQ1 ), then there exists a unique voting
equilibrium with relevant informative voting in the continuation Γ(v0), in which liberals
vote their bias and conservatives play a k-informative strategy profile with conservative
bias, with k = nQ1 − [ρ′Q(v0, σ0)− rQ1 ] = nQ1 − [ρQ− (1− nA1 )] informative votes. But then
note that since passage of the proposal implies that
∑
i∈QI1 si ≥ ρQ, there exists a voting
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equilibrium in which members of the originating committee vote in favor of the proposal
uninformatively, and on the equilibrium path members of the receiving committee play
the voting equilibrium with relevant informative voting.16 The comparison between this
and the most informative EMR voting equilibrium is now immediate. In essence, the
comparison hinges between the size of the population possibly voting informatively in a
EMR voting equilibria (nQ0 ) and the majority premium of conservatives in C1, n
Q
1 − nA1 .
Remark 1 Suppose that both committees operate under simple majority rule, and that
Q1 ∈ B(C1). (i) If the number of conservatives in C0 is larger than the majority premium
of conservatives in C1 (i.e., n
Q
0 > n
Q
1 − nA1 ), then whenever there exists a voting equilib-
rium with informative voting in C1 only, σ
∗, there also exists a EMR voting equilibrium
σ∗∗ that improves the welfare of conservatives vis a vis σ∗; (ii) for any majority premium
of conservatives in C1 for which there exists a voting equilibrium with informative voting
in C1 only, there is a low enough n
Q
0 (n
Q
0 < n
Q
1 −nA1 + 1− ρQ) such that if a EMR voting
equilibrium σ∗∗ exists, it is dominated by σ∗ in terms of conservatives’ welfare.
Suppose on the other hand that liberals are a winning coalition in the receiving
committee. Then again assuming that σ0 is uninformative (and letting v0 = σ0(s0) be
the associated voting outcome), Proposition 3 implies that there exists a unique voting
equilibrium with relevant informative voting in the continuation Γ(v0) if and only if
(1− ρA) ≤ RA1 − rA1 + 1, and in this equilibrium conservatives vote their bias and liberals
play a k-informative strategy profile with liberal bias, k = nA1 −[rA1 −(1−ρ′A(v0, σ0))]+1 =
nA1 − [(1 + nQ1 )− (1− ρA)] + 1. Here, however, inducing conservatives in the originating
committee to unconditionally “defer” the decision to the receiving committee is not
always possible (at least not when they can block the passage of the proposal in C0).
A necessary and sufficient condition for this is that the bias of both conservatives and
liberals are small enough relative to the size of the receiving committee. However, when
liberals are a winning coalition in the receiving committee, whenever there exists an
EMR voting equilibrium, liberals must control the originating committee as well (and
the number of informative votes in EMR voting equilibria is bounded above by the
majority premium in the originating committee). As a result, the relevant comparison
now is entirely between majority premiums in each committee:
Remark 2 Suppose that both committees operate under simple majority rule, and that
A1 ∈ W (C1). (i) If the majority premium of liberals in C0 is larger than in C1 (i.e.,
nA0 − nQ0 > nA1 − nQ1 ), then whenever there exists a voting equilibrium with informative
voting in C1 only, σ
∗, there also exists a EMR voting equilibrium σ∗∗ that improves the
welfare of conservatives vis a vis σ∗. Conversely, if nA0 − nQ0 ≤ nA1 − nQ1 , then whenever
there exists a EMR voting equilibrium σ∗∗, there also exists a voting equilibrium with
16Suppose that C1 members treat any deviation from σ0 as uninformative (note that this should always
be the case for conservatives), and play the voting equilibrium with relevant informative voting following
any v0 such that t0(v0) ≥ r0 = 1. Note that i ∈ C0’s vote can only be outcome relevant if there are n0−12
conservative partisans - which in particular is not possible if A0 ∈ W (C0) - so that t0−i = 0. But then
i’s vote changes the outcome if and only if almost surely
∑k
i=1 si ≥ ρQ, and hence no individual in C0
prefers to deviate and vote against the proposal.
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informative voting in C1 only, σ
∗, which improves the welfare of conservatives vis a vis
σ∗∗.
4.4 Relevant Informative Voting in Both Committees
We consider next candidate equilibria in which some members of both committees vote
informatively, restricting ourselves to profiles that are monotonically responsive. Say that
the tally t0(σ0(s0)) is informative if (i) σi(s, ∅) = s for all s for some i ∈ C0, and (ii) ∃
s0 such that t0(σ0(s0)) ≥ r0.
Definition 2 We say that a strategy profile σ∗ is a monotonically responsive voting equi-
librium if (i) it is a voting equilibrium, (ii) t0(σ
∗
0(s0)) is informative, and (iii) ∀ s1,
t0(σ
∗
0(s0)) ≥ t0(σ∗0(s′0)) ⇒ t1(σ∗(s1, s0)) ≥ t1(σ∗(s1, s′0)), with strict inequality for some
s1, s0 and s
′
0.
Voting equilibria with relevant two sided informative voting have two properties.
First, the probability of passage of the proposal in the second committee is increasing in
the tally of votes in favor of the proposal in the first committee. Essentially, the proposal
must go through two relevant tests to succeed, and the level of difficulty of the second
test decreases the more favorable the result of the initial test. Second, the number of
informative votes in the receiving committee is decreasing in the difference between the
effective hurdle r′ that these individuals voting informatively in the receiving committee
must surpass and their ex post bias ρ′, after observing the public signal τs0(t0, σ0).
As before, here the problem of members of the receiving committee is equivalent to
that of members of a single committee (after observing a public signal τs0(t0, σ0)): i ∈ C1’s
vote is influential to the outcome if and only if it is pivotal in the traditional sense of
being the decisive vote in a divided committee (if it is standard-pivotal). The problem
of members of the originating committee, however, changes significantly: i ∈ C0’s vote
matters not only according to whether it is necessary to pass the proposal or not in
the initiating committee, but also as a way to transmit information to members of the
receiving committee (the signal-pivotal motive). As a result, while in a voting equilibrium
with one sided informative voting in the originating committee there is only one way
of being pivotal (absent name-flipping), when individuals in the receiving committee
also vote informatively this is generically no longer the case; i.e., the set K(σ) ≡ {k :
SP i(r1, k) 6= ∅} has typically more than one element.
Our first goal is to exploit the implications of the incentive compatibiliy constraints
of individuals in both committees to restrict the set of strategy profiles that can possibly
be voting equilibria. Recall first (see Proposition 3) that for any voting outcome v0 in
the originating committee, the number of informative votes in the receiving committee in
the unique equilibrium with relevant informative voting in the continuation game Γ(v0)
is decreasing in the difference between the effective hurdle r′ that individuals voting
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informatively must surpass, and their ex post bias ρ′ after observing the public signal
τs0(t0, σ0).
Now, by monotonicity, if there is relevant informative voting in the receiving commit-
tee following voting outcomes v0 and v
′
0 in the originating committee, then there must
also be relevant informative voting in C1 following v
′′
0 whenever t0(v0) ≤ t0(v′′0) ≤ t0(v′0).
Furthermore, since the only relevant difference for individuals in the receiving committee
between voting outcomes v′0 and v
′′
0 with adjacent tallies (t0(v
′′
0) = t0(v
′
0) + 2) lies almost
surely in the (different) realization of the signal of a member of C0 voting informatively,
then the number of individuals voting informatively in the respective continuation games
in the receiving commitee, k˜(t0(v0)), must increase or decrease linearly with t0 and in
particular must satisfy |k˜(t0(v′′0))− k˜(t0(v′0))| = 2. In fact, as Proposition 3 also shows, if
k˜(t0(v0)) is increasing at some t and decreasing at t
′, then t < t′, with individuals initially
switching from voting against the proposal unconditionally to voting informatively - for
tallies in some range θ0 < t0 < θ0 - and then from voting informatively to voting in favor
of the proposal in some range θ0 < t0 < θ0.
As a result, in any voting equilibrium with relevant two-sided informative voting,
the likelihood of the proposal defeating the status quo is not a step function as under an
EMR voting equilibrium, but is instead strictly increasing with the tally in the originating
committee (for voting outcomes v0 in C0 such that θ0 < t0(v0) < θ0). We then have,
Proposition 4 Suppose σ is a MR voting equilibrium with relevant two-sided informative
voting. Then there exist θ0, θ0 and θ0 ( r0 − 1 ≤ θ0 ≤ θ0 ≤ θ0 ≤ n0 + 1), and k˜0(t0),
k˜1(t0) such that: (i) individuals in a winning or blocking coalition in C1 play a k˜
0(t0(v0))-
informative strategy profile with conservative bias for all v0 : θ0 + 1 ≤ t0(v0) ≤ θ0− 1 and
a k˜1(t0(v0))-informative strategy profile with liberal bias for v0 : θ0 + 1 ≤ t0(v0) ≤ θ0 − 1.
Moreover, k˜0(t0 + 2) = k˜
0(t0) + 2, and k˜
1(t0 + 2) = k˜
1(t0)− 2; (ii) a decisive majority of
individuals in C1 votes uninformatively for Q if t0(v0) < θ0 or A if t0(v0) > θ0.
Proposition 4 offers a partial characterization of a voting equilibrium with relevant
two-sided informative voting, assuming that such a voting equilibrium exists. But is it at
all possible to have two-sided relevant informative voting in equilibrium? We show below
that this is indeed the case. In particular, we show that for an equilibrium of this class to
exist it is sufficient that conservatives form a blocking coalition in the receiving committee
and that the number of conservatives in the originating committee is sufficiently large. We
also show, however, that the large number of conservatives in the originating committee is
only a sufficient condition, and that there also exists a voting equilibrium with relevant
two sided informative voting in which each of a small number of conservatives in the
originating committee (but at least ρQ) votes informatively when liberals are sufficiently
numerous (moreover, this strategy profile remains an equilibrium when voting within
each committee is allowed to be sequential as well).
To see the intuition for this result, assume then that conservatives are a blocking
coalition in the receiving committee, and consider the problem of an individual i ∈ C0
17
Figure 1: Two-Sided Relevant Informative Voting
voting informatively in a voting equilibrium with relevant two-sided informative voting.
Fix any voting outcome of the remaining members of the initiating committee such that
θ0+2 ≤ t0−i(v0−i) ≤ θ0−2. For i’s vote to be payoff relevant, it must be that the proposal
loses against the status quo in Γ(v−0−i) but defeats it in Γ(v
+
0−i). But from Proposition
4, this must be due to the vote of two members of the receiving committee who vote
uninformatively against the proposal in Γ(v−0−i) but vote informatively in Γ(v
+
0−i), in
response to the (almost sure) reversal of a negative signal in the originating committee
leading from t0−i(v0−i)− 1 to t0−i(v0−i) + 1. This implies (as we show in Lemma 6 in the
appendix) that here β(ρQ− 1 + si) ≤ lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, t0−i(v0−i))) ≤ β(ρQ + si),
and therefore that, conditional on any v0−i with a tally in (θ0, θ0), a conservative in the
originating committee has incentives to vote informatively (and therefore also a liberal
in the originating committee to vote his bias).
The same is true therefore in expectation if all possible voting outcomes in the orig-
inating committee have tallies in θ0 + 2 ≤ t0−i(v0−i) ≤ θ0 − 2. So suppose that in fact
liberals in C0 vote their bias, and (all) conservatives in C0 vote informatively. Proposi-
tion 3 showed that there can only exist a voting equilibrium with informative voting in a
continuation Γ(v0) if ρ
′
Q(v0, σ0) ≤ RQ1 , or equivalently τs0(t0(v0), σ0) ≥ ρQ−
(
nQ1 −nA1 +r1
2
)
.
Lemma 5 in the appendix shows that if given σ0, this inequality holds as an equality
for a t0(v0) such that r0 − 1 ≤ t0(v0) ≤ n0 − 1, then we can always find θ0 such that
no individual in C0 would want to deviate from playing according to σ0 conditional
on knowing t0−i(v0−i) = θ0. If in addition ρ
′
Q(v0, σ0) ≥ rQ1 for all v0, or equivalently
τs0(n0, σ0) − ρQ ≤ nA1 − r1, then Proposition 3 shows that for all feasible voting out-
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comes in C0, if there is a voting equilibrium in Γ(v0) with informative voting, it must
be that conservatives in C1 play a k-informative strategy profile with conservative bias
(i.e., for all feasible v0−i, t0−i(v0−i) ≤ θ0− 1). In terms of the composition and size of the
committees, the previous conditions can be written as:
0 ≤ nQ0 − ρQ ≤ nA1 − r1 and nA0 ≥
nQ1 − nA1 + r1
2
+ (r0 − ρQ) (5)
Our previous argument then suggests that if conditions (5) hold, there will exist a
voting equilibrium with relevant two-sided informative voting in which all conservatives in
the originating committee vote informatively. Note moreover, that we have argued above
that conservatives in the originating committee have incentives to vote informatively not
only in expectation but also conditional on any v0−i with a tally in (θ0, θ0). But together
with the results of Dekel and Piccione (2000) this directly implies that the previous
strategy profile is also a voting equilibrium for sequential voting within each committee
(as are voting equilibria with one sided informative voting). To be more precise, say
that a voting equilibrium is robust to sequential voting within each committee if every
T -period voting game has a Nash Equilibrium in which for any history of votes observed
prior to the play of any individual i, the vote choice conditional on si is the same as that
prescribed by σ. Then we have
Theorem 3 Suppose that Q1 ∈ B(C1) and that conditions (5) hold. Then
(i) there exists a voting equilibrium with relevant two-sided informative voting that is
robust to sequential voting within each committee. Moreover,
(ii) there exists an equilibrium of this class in which all conservatives in the originating
committee vote informatively. In any such equilibrium, conservatives in the receiving
committee vote against the proposal unconditionally if t0(v0) < θ0 and otherwise play a
[k + t0(v0)]-informative strategy profile with conservative bias.
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Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
Theorem 3 has the following immediate implication:
Corollary 1 Let σ∗ be the strategy profile of Theorem 3, and µ(t0;σ) = Pr(z1 = A|t0;σ)
denote the conditional probability of the proposal being accepted conditional on the tally
t0 ≥ r0 in C0 (given σ). Then (i) µ(t0;σ∗) < 1 for all t0 ≥ r0, and (ii) µ(t0;σ∗) is strictly
increasing in t0 for all t0 > θ0.
17A similar strategy profile in which some conservatives vote uninformatively in favor of the proposal
- reducing therefore the probability of incorrectly killing the proposal in the originating committee - can
shown to be a voting equilibrium in environments (composition of committees) in which the profile in
Theorem 3 is not; i.e., even when conditions (5) do not hold. This follows immediately from Theorem
3 after noting that uninformative conservatives would not have profitable deviations, since then our
previous analysis applies with the relabeling n′A0 = n
A
0 + (n
Q
0 − k0) and n′Q0 = k0. Any such strategy
profile is dominated however in terms of conservatives’ welfare by the equilibrium of Theorem 3 whenever
this exists.
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In the equilibrium of Theorem 3 conservatives voting informatively in the originat-
ing committee have incentives to do so - whenever relevant - even after observing the
vote of the other committee members. These results, however, hold for committee com-
positions that assure that the ex post bias of conservatives in the receiving committee
ρQ − τs0(n0, σ0) is larger than the effective hurdle for conservatives in the receiving com-
mittee when liberals vote their bias, r1 − nA1 , so that conservatives in the receiving
committee play in equilibrium a k-informative strategy profile with conservative bias.
Can we extend these results when under σ0 instead τs0(n0, σ0)− ρQ > nA1 − r1 so that
in equilibrium conservatives in the receiving committee play a k-informative strategy
profile with liberal bias? First, Lemma 6 shows that for θ0 + 2 ≤ t0−i(v0−i) ≤ θ0 − 2,
β(ρQ + si) ≤ lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, t0−i(v0−i))) ≤ β(ρQ + 1 + si), which does not
guarantee that a conservative in the originating committee would have incentives to
vote informatively after receiving a negative signal conditional on θ0 + 2 ≤ t0−i(v0−i) ≤
θ0 − 2. To be clear, we introduce the following notion. Suppose that the strategy profile
σ∗ is a voting equilibrium given biases piQ, piA. Say that the voting equilibrium σ∗ is
generic if it is also a voting equilibrium for any β(ρQ(piQ) − 1) ≤ pi′Q ≤ β(ρQ(piQ)) and
β(ρA(piA) − 1)) ≤ pi′A ≤ β(ρA(piA)). Then the conditions in Theorem 3 are necessary
and sufficient, in the sense that a voting equilibrium with relevant two-sided informative
voting in which all conservatives in the originating committee vote informatively, that
is generic and robust to sequential voting within each committee exists if and only if
conditions (5) hold (any such voting equilibrium is outcome-equivalent to the equilibrium
strategy profile of Theorem 3).
If on the other hand we relax the requirement of a voting equilibria to be robust
to sequential voting within each committee, then it is not necessary for the behavior
prescribed by σ0 to be incentive compatible conditional on all feasible t0−i(v0−i). Instead,
it is enough to provide incentives to members of C0 in expectation. Theorem 4 then shows
that if the number of conservatives and liberals in the originating committee is sufficiently
large (so that the inequality τs0(t0(v0), σ0)−ρQ ≤
(
n1−r1
2
)
holds with equality for a t0(v0)
such that r0 − 1 ≤ t0(v0) ≤ n0 − 1), we can (generically) choose θ0 and θ0 so that σ0
is incentive compatible in expectation. In terms of the composition of committees, this
requires nQ0 to be sufficiently large, and the equivalent to conditions (5) is now
nQ0 − ρQ ≥
(
n1 − 1
2
)
and nA0 ≥
nQ1 − nA1 + r1
2
+ (r0 − ρQ) (6)
Theorem 4 Suppose that Q1 ∈ B(C1). If the number of conservatives in C0 is suffi-
ciently large, then for any k0 ≥ ρQ there exists a voting equilibrium with relevant two-sided
informative voting in which k0 conservatives in the originating committee vote informa-
tively. Moreover, if conditions (6) hold, there exists a voting equilibrium with relevant
two-sided informative voting in which all conservatives in C0 vote informatively and
(i) µ(t0;σ
∗) = 0 for all r0 ≤ t0 < θ0.
(ii) µ(t0;σ
∗) ∈ (0, 1) is strictly increasing in t0 for all θ0 < t0 < θ0, and
(iii) µ(t0;σ
∗) = 1 for all t0 > θ0.
20
Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
The previous results in this section assumed that conservatives were a blocking coali-
tion in the receiving committee. Our next result shows that when liberals are a winning
coalition in the receiving committee it is necessary and sufficient that liberals also control
the originating committee for a voting equilibrium with relevant two sided informative
voting that is robust to sequential voting within each committee to exist.
Theorem 5 Assume that A1 ∈ W (C1). Then there exists a voting equilibrium with
relevant two -sided informative voting that is robust to sequential voting within each
committee if and only if A0 ∈ W (C0). Moreover, provided that n
A
0 −rA0
2
≤ (1 − ρA) + rA1 ,
there exists an equilibrium of this class with
nA0 −rA0
2
informative votes in the originating
committee.
Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we develop a simple model of strategic voting with incomplete information
and partially common values in sequential multimember committees. The model has
stark empirical implications for the analysis of voting in bicameral legislatures, as well
as for the interactions between (standing) committees and the floor of legislative bodies
and a variety of similar institutional settings in universities and business. It also offers
suggestive results for the analysis of sequential electoral systems such as the US presi-
dential election, and sequential referenda such as the one conducted for the ratification
of the proposed european constitution.18
The model accounts for the basic stylized fact that the outcome of the vote in the
first committee typically influences the outcome of the vote in the second committee
beyond the binary decision of whether to approve or reject the alternative in the first
committee: higher tallies in the first committee are associated with higher success rates
of the alternative in the second committee. Having said that, we emphasize the following
three main results. First, we show that the receiving committee can act as to modify
the effective majority rule for the originating committee, inducing informative voting by
some of its members in equilibrium. This is an important feature in settings in which the
voting rules do not adjust from issue to issue to the optimal rule a` la Austen-Smith and
Banks (1996). A key determinant of whether this can in fact occur in equilibrium is the
“partisan” composition of the receiving committee, and in particular whether conserva-
tives (biased for the status quo) can block the passage of the proposal in the receiving
18Iaryczower and Saiegh (2007) (in progress) provides an empirical examination of these hypothesis
for the House and Senate of the US Congress.
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committee. Second, we show that under some conditions voting equilibria with relevant
informative voting in the receiving committee are (Pareto) dominated by equilibria in
which all relevant informative voting takes place in the receiving committee, after the
alternative is passed unconditionally in the originating committee. Finally, we provide
conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with relevant informative voting in both
committees, and provide a partial characterization of equilibria of this class. In contrast
to voting equilibria with one-sided relevant informative voting in the originating com-
mittee, we show that in voting equilibria with relevant two-sided informative voting the
conditional probability of the alternative being chosen is strictly increasing in the tally
of votes in the originating committee. Moreover, the number of individuals voting infor-
matively in the receiving committee decreases with the difference between the effective
majority rule faced by individuals voting informatively in the receiving committee and
their effective bias (to evaluate additional information) following a voting outcomes in
the originating committee.
We close with two remarks about the model. First, note that while our model assumes
that members of the originating and receiving committee receive signals with the same
precision, in some circumstances (e.g., committee-floor) it would be desirable to allow for
a lower precision of signals of members of the receiving committee. This is, however, a
straightforward extension, and all our results continue to hold with minor amendments
in this case. A more challenging objection is the possibility of deliberation prior to the
vote, which our model ignores completely. We can of course interpret the model as
a description of the environment after communication. The question is whether it is
plausible to assume that at this point there would still be relevant private information,
or whether instead all private information would be transmitted by talking. This will
depend on the way we assume players can communicate, and on equilibrium selection.
We leave this as an empirical question. If it is, then the vote in the receiving committee
should be independent of the outcome of the vote in the originating committee, and
behavior in line with the central stylized fact would be due to factors other than the ones
considered in this paper.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. We first show that σ∗, given by (i) σ∗i (si) = si for i ≤ k, and
(ii) σ∗i (si) = −1 for i ≥ k + 1, is a voting equilibrium if and only if k = n− (ρ− r) and
r ≤ ρ ≤ R. Note first that τs−i(r − 1, σ∗−i) = r − 1 + n − k, and therefore λPi(C,r)i (si) =
β(r−1+n−k+si). Incentive compatibility then requires λPi(C,r)i (−1) = β(r+n−k−2) ≤
pi ≤ β(r + n − k) = λPi(C,r)i (1). By definition of ρ then either k = n + (r − ρ) − 1 or
k = n + (r − ρ). Proceeding similarly, we can show that the incentive constraint for
i ≥ k + 1 implies k ≥ n − (ρ − r). Feasibility requires k ≤ n, and relevant informative
voting (that z = A for some s) that k ≥ R. With k = n − (ρ − r), these imply
that r ≤ ρ ≤ R. It then follows that this strategy profile is a voting equilibrium iff
k = n− (ρ− r) and r ≤ ρ ≤ R. Similarly, we can show that σ∗∗ such that (i) σ∗∗i (si) = si
for i ≤ k, and (ii) σ∗∗i (si) = 1 for i ≥ k + 1 is a voting equilibrium if and only if
k = n + 1 − (r − ρ) and −(n − r) ≤ ρ ≤ r − 1. The result follows, since a voting
equilibrium with informative voting must be of one of these classes.
Lemma 1 If A1 ∈ W (C1), then for any k such that (1 − ρA) + 1 ≤ k ≤ (nA0 − nQ0 ) −
(1 − ρA) − (r0 − 1), there exists an EMR voting equilibrium characterized by the pair
(k, θ0(k)) = (k, (n
A
0 − k)− nQ0 − (1− ρA)) if and only if (1− ρA) ≤ n
A
0 −nQ0 −r0
2
.
Proof of Lemma 1. First we prove that if σ∗ is a EMR voting equilibrium when
A1 ∈ W (C1), then it must be the case that conservatives in C0 are voting their bias,
and liberals are playing a k-informative strategy profile with liberal bias. So suppose
then that σ∗ is a EMR voting equilibrium. Then there exists an (even) integer θ0,
r0−1 ≤ θ0 ≤ n0−1, such that t1(σ∗1(s1, σ∗0(s0))) ≤ r1−1 ∀s1 whenever t0(σ∗0(s0)) ≤ θ0−1.
This implies, in particular, that for any v0 = σ
∗
0(s0) such that t0(v0) ≤ θ0 − 1 there is a
i ∈ A1 such that σ∗i (t0(v0), 1) = −1. Now given that a R1-majority is voting against the
proposal independently of their signals, then λ
Pi(C1,r1)
i (si, v0) = β(τs0(t0(v0), σ
∗
0)+si), and
therefore incentive compatibility for i ∈ A1 following v0 = σ∗0(s0) such that t0(v0) ≤ θ0−1
requires β(τs0(t0(v0), σ
∗
0) + 1) ≤ piA, or equivalently that τs0(θ0 − 1, σ∗0) ≤ ρA − 2.
Next we argue that if i ∈ Q0, then i doesn’t vote informatively. Suppose to the con-
trary that for some i ∈ Q0, σi(∅, si) = si. Since in a EMR voting equilibrium λSPi (si; r1) =
β(τs0−i(θ0, σ
∗
0−i) + si), for incentive compatibility we need either τs0−i(θ0;σ0−i) = ρQ or
τs0−i(θ0;σ0−i) = ρQ − 1. But then τs0(θ0 − 1;σ0) ≥ τs0−i(θ0;σ0−i) − 1 ≥ ρQ − 2 > −1 ≥
ρA − 2, which is a contradiction since we have established that τs0(t0, σ0) ≤ ρA − 2
for all t0 ≤ θ0 − 1. Then there must exist an i ∈ A0 who is voting informatively.
From this it follows that in equilibrium conservatives in C0 must vote their bias; i.e.,
σi(si) = −1 for all si ∀ i ∈ Q0.19 Moreover, from this it follows that if i ∈ A0 is
19 Since some liberal is voting informatively, no conservative can be voting informatively as well. Now
suppose that at least one conservative in C0 is voting for A, and let tN0 the net tally of conservatives
and liberals voting uninformatively in C0. Then τs0(t0) = t0 − tN0 . Now suppose i ∈ Q0 voting for
A according to σ deviates and votes for Q. Conditional on reaching C1, i is taken as a partisan.
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not voting informatively, she must be voting her bias, for otherwise, letting k denote
the number of liberals voting informatively, τs0(t0;σ0) = t0 + n
Q
0 + n
A
0 − k, and thus
τs0(θ0 − 1;σ0) ≤ ρA − 2 ⇔ θ0 ≤ k − n0 − (1 − ρA) < r0. EMR voting equilibria for
A1 ∈ W (C1) can then be characterized, provided they exist, by pairs (k,θ0(k)) such that
(i) σi(s, v0) = −1 (= 1) ∀i ∈ C1, ∀v0 = σ0(s0) such that t0(v0) ≤ θ0 − 1 (≥ θ0 + 1), (ii)
σi(s, ∅) = −1 ∀ i ∈ Q0, and (iii)
σi(s, ∅) = s ∀i ∈ AI0(k) ≡ {i ∈ C0 : bi = 1, i ≤ k}
σi(s, ∅) = 1 ∀i ∈ AN0 (k) ≡ {i ∈ C0 : bi = 1, i > k}
Note then that t0(σ(s0)) = −nQ0 + (nA0 − k) +
∑
i∈AI0(k) si, so that τs0(t0;σ0) = t0 +
nQ0 − (nA0 − k), and similarly τs0−i(t0−i;σ0−i) = t0−i + nQ0 − (nA0 − k). Since λSPi (si; r1) =
β(τs0−i(θ0, σ
∗
0−i) + si), for incentive compatibility we need either τs0−i(θ0;σ0−i) = ρA or
τs0−i(θ0;σ0−i) = ρA − 1. Together with τs0(θ0 − 1, σ∗0) ≤ ρA − 2, this implies that
θ0(k) = (n
A
0 − k)− nQ0 − (1− ρA) (7)
Since we need θ0(k) ≥ r0 − 1, then k ≤ (nA0 − nQ0 )− [(1− ρA) + (r0 − 1)] (which implies
nA0 ≥ R0). Since on the equilibrium path nA0 − nQ0 − 2k ≤ t0 ≤ nA0 − nQ0 , and thus we
need nA0 − nQ0 − 2k + 1 ≤ θ0(k) ≤ nA0 − nQ0 − 1, then k ≥ 1 + (1 − ρA). There exists a
k satisfying these two inequalities if and only if (1 − ρA) ≤ n
A
0 −nQ0 −r0
2
. To show that σ∗
is a voting equilibrium for k : 1 + (1− ρA) ≤ k ≤ (nA0 − nQ0 )− [(1− ρA) + (r0 − 1)] and
θ0(k) = (n
A
0 −k)−nQ0 − (1−ρA) it only remains to show that members of the originating
committee that don’t vote informatively do not have profitable deviations. Note that
these deviations produce histories that have zero probability. Suppose then that members
of the receiving committee treat these deviations as informative: if i ∈ AN0 votes against
the proposal then j ∈ C1 believes si = −1, similarly for i ∈ Q0. Note that σ∗1 is consistent
with these beliefs. Note that if i ∈ AI0, and j ∈ AN0 , then τs0−j(t;σ0−j) = τs0−i(t;σ0−i)+1,
and if ` ∈ Q0, then τs0−`(t;σ0−j) = τs0−i(t;σ0−i) − 1. It follows from these and the fact
that i ∈ AI0 doesn’t have a profitable deviation, that no player wants to deviate.
Lemma 2 If Q1 ∈ B(C1), there exists a EMR voting equilibrium with k informative
votes (1 + ρQ ≤ k ≤ nQ0 ) if and only if −(n0 − r0 − k) ≤ 1 + ρQ ≤ nQ0 . If all individuals
voting uninformatively in C0 vote their bias then there exists a EMR voting equilibrium
with k informative votes (1 + ρQ ≤ k ≤ nQ0 ) if and only if nQ0 ≥ 1 + ρQ and nA0 ≥
(r0 − 1)− ρQ.
The deviation therefore only matters if t0−i = r0 − 1 (and it does matter here, since the outcome
following v0 such that t0−i = r0 is A with positive probability). This is a profitable deviation for i
iff β(τs0−i(r0 − 1) − 1) = β(r0 − 1 − (tN0 − 1) − 1) ≤ β(ρQ − 1) ⇔ r0 ≤ ρQ + tN0 . So assume instead
that r0 > ρQ + tN0 . For liberals in C1 to vote for Q following t0 = θ0 − 1 we need τs0(θ0 − 1) ≤
−(1+(1−ρA))⇔ θ0 ≤ tN0 −(1−ρA). For a liberal voting informatively not to have incentives to deviate
we need β(τs0−i(θ0)−1) ≤ piA ≤ β(τs0−i(θ0)+1), and from this it follows that in fact θ0 = tN0 − (1−ρA).
But since we have assumed that r0 > ρQ + tN0 , then r0 > θ0 + 1, which is a contradiction with our
hypothesis that θ0 ≥ r0 − 1.
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Proof of Lemma 2. Proceeding exactly as in the proof of Lemma 1 we can establish
that in a EMR voting equilibrium (i) τs0(θ0 + 1, σ
∗
0) ≥ ρQ + 1, (ii) i ∈ A0 doesn’t vote
informatively, and (iii) there exists i ∈ Q0 who votes informatively. Equilibrium does not
pin down from this the behavior of liberals or conservatives voting uninformatively in C0,
and as a result for equilibrium purposes we are only concerned in C0 with the incentive
compatibility constraints of individuals voting informatively.20 Now denote the net tally
of liberals in C0 by t
A
0 , and the net tally of conservatives voting uninformatively in C0
when σ0 contains k informative votes by t
QN
0 (k). Then τs0(t0, σ
∗
0) = t0 − tA0 − tQN0 (k),
and therefore (i) above implies θ0 ≥ tA0 + tQN0 + ρQ. Incentive compatibility of σ for
i ∈ Q0 requires β(τs0−i(θ0;σ∗0−i) − 1) ≤ piQ ≤ β(τs0−i(θ0;σ∗0−i) + 1), and therefore either
τs0−i(θ0;σ0−i) = ρQ or τs0−i(θ0;σ0−i) = ρQ−1, which together with the previous inequality
imply θ0 = t
A
0 +t
QN
0 +ρQ. For feasibility we need r0−1 ≤ θ0 ≤ n0−1 and tA0 +tQN0 (k)−k+
1 ≤ θ0 ≤ tA0 +tQN0 (k)+k−1, or equivalently max{r0−1−tA0 −tQN0 (k), 1−k} ≤ ρQ ≤ k−1.
This results in two relevant inequalities: k ≥ 1+ρQ (which implies the necessary condition
nQ0 ≥ 1 + ρQ) and
ρQ ≥ r0 − 1− tA0 − tQN0 (k) (8)
Note that the right hand side of (8) is minimized when all individuals voting uninfor-
matively in C0 vote for A, in which case this becomes ρQ ≥ r0 − 1 − n0 + k, so the
maximum number of individuals voting informative is (k ≤) ρQ + n0 − (r0 − 1). Note
that if instead conservatives in C0 voting uninformative vote their bias, (8) becomes k ≥
nQ0 −nA0 +(r0−1)−ρQ. That is, in this case we need k ≥ max{1+ρQ, nQ0 −nA0 +(r0−1)−ρQ},
and therefore the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a EMR voting
equilibrium with any number 1 + ρQ ≤ k ≤ nQ0 of conservatives voting informatively and
the remaining conservatives voting their bias uninformatively is that nQ0 ≥ 1 + ρQ and
nA0 ≥ (r0 − 1)− ρQ.
Lemma 3 All voting equilibria with relevant informative voting only in the originating
committee must be EMR voting equilibria.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose not. Then there are at least two cutpoints in the
receiving committee. If all of these are below the cutpoint of the EMR voting equilibrium,
the IC of members of the originating committee voting informatively would be violated.
The same would occur if all the cutpoints are above the cutpoint of the EMR voting
equilibrium. Then at least one cutpoint must be below and one above θ`. But then the
IC of members of the relevant majority in the receiving committee must be violated in
some continuation.
To state Lemma 4 formally, we need to develop some terminology. We say that σ
produces an optimal policy for individuals with bias b given a realization of signals s, and
20The deviations of individuals voting uninformatively are (when they are supposed to vote against
their bias) or can be made to be (when they are supposed to vote for their bias) uninformative, and as
a result only matter in the event that t0−i = r0 − 1, but then never, since independently of their vote
here the outcome is Q for sure.
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denote this by Oσb (s) = 1, if t0(σ0) ≥ r0 and t1(σ1(s1, σ0)) ≥ r1 ⇔ t(s) ≥ ρb. Otherwise
we let Ob(s;σ) = 0. That is, we define the mapping Ob(·;σ) : S → {0, 1} by Ob(s;σ) = 1
if t0(σ0) ≥ r0 and t1(σ1(s1, σ0)) ≥ r1 ⇔ t(s) ≥ ρb, and Ob(s;σ) = 0 otherwise. Let
Ob(σ) ≡
∑
s:Ob(s;σ)=1
Pr(s) denote the probability that σ produces an optimal policy for
individuals with bias b. Given a committee C ′, let ΣC′ denote the set of uninformative
and EMR voting equilibria, and let σC′ denote the most informative equilibrium in ΣC′ .
Let C(k) ≡ {nQ0 (k), nA0 (k), nQ1 (k), nA1 (k)}. We say that a sequence of committees {C(k)}k
is increasing if nbj(k + 1) > n
b
j(k) ∀k, j = 0, u and b = Q,A. We say that a sequence of
committees is liberal (conservative) if A1(k) ∈ W (C1(k)) (Q1(k) ∈ B(C1(k))) ∀k. Then
Lemma 4 (i) For any ε > 0 and increasing sequence of conservative committees {C(k)}k,
there exists a k such that if k ≥ k, |Ob(σCk)− 1| < ε. However, (ii) there exists an ε > 0
and an increasing sequence of liberal committees {C(k)}k such that |Ob(σCk)−1| > ε ∀k.
Proof of Lemma 4. For (ii), it is enough to note that if along a sequence nQ0 (k) ≥
nA0 (k), the most informative voting equilibrium is the non-informative equilibrium. The
result follows, since we can always find an increasing sequence of committees with this
property. For (i), note first that there is always a k+ such that the strategy profile σ∗
in part (i) of Theorem 2 is a voting equilibrium. Therefore for k ≥ k+, σ∗C′ is the most
informative equilibrium in ΣC′ . Now
∑n
i=1 si ≥ ρQ ⇔
∑n
i=1 s
+
i ≥ n+ρQ2 ⇔ 1n
∑n
i=1 s
+
i ≥
1
2
+
ρQ
2n
. So suppose that ω = ωA. Conditional on ωA, signals are i.i.d. Bernoulli(q) random
variables. The strong law of large numbers then implies that Pr(limn→∞ 1n
∑n
i=1 s
+
i =
q) = 1, and therefore (since q > 1/2) that Pr(limn→∞
[
1
n
∑n
i=1 s
+
i −
(
1
2
+
ρQ
2n
)] ≥ 0) = 1.
However, it also implies that Pr(limnQ0 →∞
[
1
nQ0
∑
i∈Q0 s
+
i −
(
1
2
+
ρQ
2n
)] ≥ 0) = 1. Therefore
for large committees, conditional on ω = ωA, both optimality for conservatives and the
most informative equilibrium in ΣC′ choose A with probability 1. A similar argument
can be made with ω = ωQ. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. (i) Suppose that liberals in C0 vote their bias and that - as
hypothesized - conservatives in C0 vote informatively. By Proposition 4, we know that
if a MR voting equilibrium σ with relevant two-sided informative voting exists, then it
must be that there exist θ0, θ0 and θ0 ( r0−1 ≤ θ0 ≤ θ0 ≤ θ0 ≤ n0+1), and k˜0(t0), k˜1(t0)
such that liberals in C1 vote their bias in any Γ(v0) such that θ0 + 1 ≤ t0(v0) ≤ θ0 − 1
and conservatives in C1 play a k˜
0(t0(v0))-informative strategy profile with conservative
bias for all v0 : θ0 + 1 ≤ t0(v0) ≤ θ0 − 1 and a k˜1(t0(v0))-informative strategy profile
with conservative bias for v0 : θ0 + 1 ≤ t0(v0) ≤ θ0 − 1. By Proposition 3, these
strategy profiles are equilibria in Γ(v0) for all v0 : θ0 + 1 ≤ t0(v0) ≤ θ0 − 1 if and only
if k˜0(t0) = r1 + n
Q
1 − nA1 − ρQ + (t0 − nA0 ) and (from feasibility and relevant informative
voting)
ρQ + n
A
0 −
(nQ1 − nA1 + r1)
2
≤ θ0 + 1 ≤ θ0 − 1 ≤ nA1 + ρQ + nA0 − r1 (9)
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, and are equilibria in Γ(v0) for all v0 : θ0 + 1 ≤ t0(v0) ≤ θ0 − 1 if and only if k˜1(t0) =
ρQ + n1 − (r1 − 1)− (t0 − nA0 ) and (from feasibility and relevant informative voting)
nA1 + ρQ + n
A
0 − r1 + 1 ≤ θ0 + 1 ≤ θ0 − 1 ≤ ρQ + nA0 +
n1 − r1
2
(10)
We want to show that there exist r0−1 ≤ θ0 ≤ θ0 ≤ θ0 ≤ n0+1 satisfying (9) and (10)
when relevant such that β(ρQ− 1 + si) ≤ λSPi (si; r1) ≤ β(ρQ + si), eliminating profitable
deviations for i ∈ Q0, where λSPi (si; r1) is given by (2) with K(σ) = {k : θ0 ≤ k ≤ θ0};
i.e.,
λSPi (si; r1) =
θ0∑
k=θ0
lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, k))f(si, k) (11)
(ii) Let θ0 = ρQ+n
A
0 − (n
Q
1 −nA1 +r1)
2
−1, and let θ0 = θ0 = n0+1. Let σi(v0, si) = −1 for
all si, for all i ∈ C1 for all v0 : t0(v0) ≤ θ0− 1. The conditions nA0 ≥ n
Q
1 −nA1 +r1
2
+ (r0− ρQ)
and nQ0 − ρQ ≥ 0 imply, respectively, that θ0 ≥ r0 − 1, and θ0 ≤ n0 − 1. By Lemma
5, lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, θ0) = β(ρQ − 1 + s0i ). By Lemma 6, β(ρQ − 1 + s0i ) ≤
lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, tˆ0)) ≤ β(ρQ + s0i ) for all v0−i : t0−i(v0−i) = tˆ0, with θ0 + 2 ≤
tˆ0 ≤ θ0 − 2. But then we are done, since nQ0 − ρQ ≤ nA1 − r1 implies - noting that
k˜0([nA1 + n
A
0 + ρQ − (r1 − 1)] − 1) = nQ1 - that for all tallies on the equilibrium path
t0(σ0(s0) (and in fact for all feasible tallies), t0(σ0(s0)) ≤ θ0 − 1.
Lemma 5 Let Q1 ∈ B(C1). Suppose that σ is a MR voting equilibrium with relevant
two-sided informative voting, and that i ∈ C0 votes informatively. Let θ0 = ρQ + nA0 −
(nQ1 −nA1 +r1)
2
− 1. Then lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, θ0) = β(ρQ − 1 + s0i )
Proof of Lemma 5. Fix v0−i : t0−i(v0−i) = θ0. First note that since t0(v
−
0−i) = θ0−1,
then t1(σ
∗
1(s1, v
−
0−i)) ≤ r1 − 2 ∀ s1, and as a result, L(t1(v
v−0−i
1 ) ≤ r1 − 2, t1(v
v+0−i
1 ) ≥ r1) =
L(t1(v
v+0−i
1 ) ≥ r1). Now according to σ∗, this is t1(σ∗1(s1, v+0−i)) = nA1 − [nQ1 − k˜0(θ0 +
1)] +
∑k˜0(θ0+1)
j=1 sj ≥ r1, or equivalently,
∑k˜0(θ0+1)
j=1 sj ≥ (nQ1 − nA1 + r1)− k˜0(θ0 + 1). But∑k˜0(θ0+1)
j=1 sj ≤ k˜0(θ0 + 1). We now choose θ0 + 1 so that z = A following θ0 + 1 is only
consistent, according to σ∗, with k˜0(θ0 + 1) =
(nQ1 −nA1 +r1)
2
positive signals:
θ0 = ρQ + n
A
0 −
(nQ1 − nA1 + r1)
2
− 1 (12)
As a result, t1(σ
∗
1(s1, v
+
0−i)) ≥ r1 ⇔ s1 ∈
{
s1 : t1(s1) =
(
nQ1 −nA1 +r1
2
)}
, and L(t1(v
v+0−i
1 ) ≥
1) =
(
1−q
q
) nQ1 −nA1 +r1
2
!
. Note next that τs0−i(t, σ
∗
0−i) = t − nA0 , so that τs0−i(θ0, σ∗0−i) =
27
ρQ −
(
nQ1 −nA1 +r1
2
)
− 1, and therefore L(v0−i : t0−i(v0−i) = θ0) =
(
1−q
q
)ρQ− nQ1 −nA1 +12 !−1
.
Putting these observations together we obtain the result.
Lemma 6 Let Q1 ∈ B(C1). Suppose that σ is a MR voting equilibrium with relevant
two-sided informative voting, and that i ∈ C0 votes informatively.
(i) Let v0−i be a voting outcome in C0−i such that θ0 + 2 ≤ t0−i(v0−i) ≤ θ0 − 2. Then
β(ρQ − 1 + si) ≤ lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, t0−i(v0−i))) ≤ β(ρQ + si)
(ii) Let v0−i be a voting outcome in C0−i such that θ0 + 2 ≤ t0−i(v0−i) ≤ θ0− 2. Then
β(ρQ + si) ≤ lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, t0−i(v0−i))) ≤ β(ρQ + 1 + si)
Proof of Lemma 6. Consider part (i). Fix v0−i : t0−i(v0−i) = tˆ0 for θ0 + 2 ≤ tˆ0 ≤
θ0 − 2. We know already that τs0−i(t, σ∗0−i) = t − nA0 , so that L(v0−i : t0−i(v0−i) = tˆ0) =(
1−q
q
)tˆ0−nA0
. Next note that according to σ∗, i’s vote is influential only if t1(σ∗1(s1, v
−
0−i)) ≤
r−2 and t1(σ∗1(s1, v+0−i)) ≥ r. But t1(σ∗1(s1, v−0−i)) = nA1 −(nQ1 −k˜0(tˆ0−1))+
∑k˜0(tˆ0−1)
i=1 si ≤
r − 2, or if and only if for some labeling of the individuals voting informatively
k˜0(tˆ0−1)∑
i=1
si ≤ ρQ + nA0 − tˆ0 − 1 (13)
Similarly t1(σ
∗
1(s1, v
+
0−i)) ≥ r if and only if
k˜0(tˆ0+1)∑
i=1
si =
k˜0(tˆ0−1)∑
i=1
si +
k˜0(tˆ0+1)∑
i=k˜0(tˆ0−1)+1
si ≥ ρQ + nA0 − tˆ0 − 1 (14)
Since
∑k˜0(tˆ0+1)
i=k˜0(tˆ0−1)+1 si ≤ 2, this implies that to the knowledge that
∑nQ0
i=1 si = tˆ0−nA0 in
C0, we must add
∑k˜0(tˆ0−1)−1
i=1 si = ρQ+n
A
0 −tˆ0−2, sk˜0(tˆ0+1) = 1 and (sk˜0(tˆ0−1), sk˜0(tˆ0−1)+1) ∈{(−1, 1); (1,−1); (1, 1)} (or permutations thereof). Denoting this latter event by Z, we
have
Pr(Z|ωQ)
Pr(Z|ωA) =
2q(1−q)+(1−q)2
2q(1−q)+q2 >
1−q
q
, and therefore
Pr(Z|ωQ)
Pr(Z|ωA) = µ
1−q
q
for some µ > 1. Thus
lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, tˆ0)) = 1
1 + µ
(
1−q
q
)ρQ+si = 1
1 +
(
1−q
q
)ρQ+si−x
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for some x ∈ (0, 1). Equivalently, lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, tˆ0)) = β(ρQ + si − x) for
some x ∈ (0, 1), which implies the claim. Part (ii) follows from the same argument, noting
that inequalities (13) and (14) become
∑k˜1(tˆ0−1)
i=1 si ≤ ρQ + nA0 − tˆ0 and
∑k˜1(tˆ0+1)
i=1 si ≥
ρQ + n
A
0 − tˆ0.
Proof of Theorem 4. Repeat here step (i) in the proof of Proposition 3. Next
let σi(v0, si) = −1 (=1) for all si, for all i ∈ C1 for all v0 : t0(v0) ≤ θ0 − 1 (≥ θ0 + 1).
Let θ0 = ρQ + n
A
0 − (n
Q
1 −nA1 +r1)
2
− 1. As before, the conditions nA0 ≥ n
Q
1 −nA1 +r1
2
+ (r0 − ρQ)
and nQ0 − ρQ ≥ 0 imply, respectively, that θ0 ≥ r0 − 1, and θ0 ≤ n0 − 1. By Lemma 5,
lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, θ0) = β(ρQ−1+s0i ). Now if nQ0 −ρQ ≤ nA1 −r1, we know that the
result holds by Proposition 3. Therefore assume to the contrary that nA1 −r1+2 ≤ nQ0 −ρQ,
so that maxs0 t0(σ0(s0)) ≥ θ0+1 for all θ0 satisfying (9). Let θ0 = nA1 +nA0 +ρQ−(r1−1).
By Lemma 6, β(ρQ − 1 + s0i ) ≤ lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, tˆ0)) ≤ β(ρQ + s0i ) for all v0−i :
t0−i(v0−i) = tˆ0, with θ0 + 2 ≤ tˆ0 ≤ θ0 − 2. We now show that there exists a θ0 ≥ θ0
satisfying (10) such that β(ρQ−1+si) ≤ λSPi (si; r1) ≤ β(ρQ+si), eliminating deviations
for i ∈ Q0. In what follows we will make explicit the dependency of λSPi (si; r1) on θ0 in
σ∗ by writing λSPi (si; r1, θ0) (here we fix θ0 and θ0 at the values specified above).
First note that if θ0 = θ0 = n
A
1 +n
A
0 +ρQ−(r1−1), then λSPi (si; r1; θ0) ≤ β(ρQ+si). To
see this note that since Q loses against A independently of s1 in Γ(v
+
0−i), L(SP i(r1, θ0)) =
L(t1(v
v−0−i
1 ) ≤ r1 − 2) = L(
∑nQ1
j=1 sj ≤ r1 − 2 − nA1 ) ≥
(
1−q
q
)(r1−2−nA1 )
by Lemma 7.
Since also τs0−i(θ0, σ
∗
0−i) = n
A
1 + ρQ − (r1 − 1), and thus L(v0−i : t0−i(v0−i) = θ0) =(
1−q
q
)nA1 +ρQ−(r1−1)
, we have lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, tˆ0)) ≤ β(ρQ + si − 1). If also
λSPi (si; r1; θ0) ≥ β(ρQ + si − 1), then we are done. So suppose not. Then in equilibrium
θ0 ≥ θ0 + 2. Since k˜0(θ0− 1) = nQ1 and k˜1(θ0 + 1) = nQ1 − 1, t1(σ∗1(s1, v−0−i)) ≤ r1− 2 and
t1(σ
∗
1(s1, v
+
0−i)) ≥ r1 only if
∑nQ1
i=1 si = r1 − 2− nA1 . Then L(SP i(r1, θ0)) =
(
1−q
q
)r1−2−nA1
,
which with L(v0−i : t0−i(v0−i) = θ0) =
(
1−q
q
)nA1 +ρQ−r1+1
gives lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, θ0)) =
β(ρQ − 1 + s0i ). Now, by Lemma 6, (a) for all v0−i : t0−i(v0−i) = tˆ0 such that θ0 + 2 ≤
tˆ0 ≤ θ0 − 2, we have β(ρQ + s0i ) ≤ lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, tˆ0)) ≤ β(ρQ + 1 + s0i ), but
(b) for all v0−i : t0−i(v0−i) = tˆ0 such that θ0 + 2 ≤ tˆ0 ≤ θ0 − 2 instead β(ρQ − 1 + s0i ) ≤
lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, tˆ0)) ≤ β(ρQ + s0i ). Together with the fact that (by Lemma 7)
lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, θ0)) is also increasing in θ0, this implies that λSPi (si; r1; θ0) is
strictly increasing in θ0 for θ0 ≥ θ0 + 2. Finally, note that if we choose
θ0 = ρQ + n
A
0 + 1 +
(
n1 − r1
2
)
(15)
and this is feasible, in the sense that θ0 = ρQ + n
A
0 +
(
n1+1
2
) ≤ n0 + 1 (which is assumed
true in the hypothesis), then lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, θ0)) = β(ρQ + si). This follows
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since L(SP i(r1, θ0)) = L(t1(vv
−
0−i
1 ) ≤ r1 − 2), and according to σ∗, t1(σ∗1(s1, v−0−i)) =
nA1 + [n
Q
1 − k˜1(θ0 − 1)] +
∑k˜1(θ0−1)
j=1 sj ≤ r1 − 2 ⇔
∑k˜1(θ0−1)
j=1 sj ≤ ρQ + nA0 − θ0, but∑k˜1(θ0−1)
j=1 sj ≥ −k˜1(θ0 − 1) = −ρQ − n1 − nA0 + θ0 + r1 − 2. Therefore with θ0 as in (15),
we have L(SP i(r1, θ0)) =
(
1−q
q
)ρQ+nA0 −θ0
, and hence lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, θ0)) =
β(ρQ + si). Therefore β(ρQ − 1 + si) ≤ λSPi (si; r1; θ0) ≤ β(ρQ + 1 + si). But then there
exists a θ0: n
A
1 + n
A
0 + ρQ− (r1− 1) ≤ θ0 ≤ ρQ + nA0 +
(
n1+1
2
)
such that β(ρQ− 1 + si) ≤
λSPi (si; r1; θ0) ≤ β(ρQ + si).
Lemma 7 (i) Pr(ωA|
∑k
i=1 si ≤ k−A) is decreasing in k and A, and (ii) Pr(ωA|
∑k
i=1 si ≤
k − A) < Pr(ωA|
∑k
i=1 si = k − A)
Proof of Lemma 7. For (i), it is enough to show that
Pr(
Pk
i=1 si≤k−A|ωQ)
Pr(
Pk
i=1 si≤k−A|ωA)
is increasing
in k and A. But this follows since
Pr(
∑k
i=1 si ≤ k − A|ωQ)
Pr(
∑k
i=1 si ≤ k − A|ωA)
=
Pr(|s−| ≥ A
2
|ωQ)
Pr(|s−| ≥ A
2
|ωA)
=
Pr(|s+| ≥ A
2
|ωA)
Pr(|s+| ≥ A
2
|ωQ)
=
∑k
t=A/2 F (t;ωA)∑k
t=A/2 F (t;ωQ)
where F (t;ωA) ≡
(
k
t
)
qt(1− q)k−t and F (t;ωQ) ≡
(
k
t
)
(1− q)tqk−t, and
F (k+1;ωA)/F (k+1;ωQ)
F (k;ωA)/F (k;ωQ)
=
(
q
1−q
)2
> 1, so that F (k+1;ωA)
F (k+1;ωQ)
> F (k;ωA)
F (k;ωQ)
. This also implies (ii).
Proof of Theorem 5. We sketch the argument, the details can be filled using
the steps in previous results. First, proceeding as in Lemma 6, we can show that if
A1 ∈ W (C1), σ is a MR voting equilibrium with relevant two-sided informative voting,
and i ∈ C0 votes informatively, then for any v0−i such that θ0 + 2 ≤ t0−i(v0−i) ≤ θ0 − 2.
β(ρA − 2 + si) ≤ lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, t0−i(v0−i))) ≤ β(ρA − 1 + si)
, while for any v0−i such that θ0 + 2 ≤ t0−i(v0−i) ≤ θ0 − 2
β(ρA − 1 + si) ≤ lim
α→0
Pr(σ,α)(ωA|si,SP i(r1, t0−i(v0−i))) ≤ β(ρA + si)
From this it follows immediately that if σ is robust to sequential voting within each com-
mittee, then only liberals in C0 can vote informatively. But then (by the same argument
as in footnote 19) conservatives in C0 must be voting their bias, and hence ifQ0 ∈ C0 there
can’t be relevant informative in C0. Next suppose that in equilibrium conservatives in the
originating committee vote their bias, and liberals play a k-informative strategy profile
with liberal bias. Note that if k ≤ nA0 −(nQ0 +r0)
2
, then t0(σ0) = −nQ0 +(nA0 −k)+
∑k
i=1 si ≥ r0
for all s0. So assume in fact that 1 ≤ k ≤ n
A
0 −(nQ0 +r0)
2
(this is possible since A0 ∈ W (C0)).
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Then τs0(t0, σ0) ≥ −k ≥ −n
A
0 −(nQ0 +r0)
2
for any s0, and thus by the assumption in the hy-
pothesis (1−ρA)+τs0(t0, σ0) ≥ −(nQ1 +r1) for any s0 (note that for k = 1 this condition is
always satisfied). But this, together with Proposition 3, implies that if there is relevant
informative voting in Γ(v0) then liberals play a k-strategy profile with liberal bias, or
equivalently that for any such v0−i = σ0−i(s0−i), θ0 + 2 ≤ t0−i(v0−i) ≤ θ0 − 2 (i.e., that
in equilibrium θ0 = θ0). If τs0(t0, σ0) + 1− ρA < n
A
1 −nQ1 −r1
2
, then we are done. Otherwise,
set θ0 so that τs0(θ0 − 1, σ0) + 1− ρA = n
A
1 −nQ1 −r1
2
.
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